the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance, this study finds that both broad-based and detailed case-based payment systems have improved efficiency as measured by a reduction in average length of stay, with little impact on the number of cases. These provider payment reforms have had no adverse impact on quality as measured by readmissions. While it is still too early to quantify the impact of Croatia's introduction of formal diagnostic related groups, it appears that the introduction of both broad and detailed case-based payment systems has improved efficiency in acute hospital care.
Introduction
Over the last decade, the Croatian health care system has undergone a series of health reforms that have helped to transform the once fragmented and highly decentralized health system into one that maintains the principles of universality and solidarity. The Croatian health system today has adequate financial resources (total health spending is 7.8% of GDP), a well-trained health workforce, an established system of public health programmes and service delivery, and good health outcomes relative to countries at comparable income levels.
The main bodies in the health care system are the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Finance, and the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance, known locally as Hrvatski zavod za zdravstveno osiguranje (HZZO). The HZZO is a public, nonprofit institution that is the main third party payer in Croatia. HZZO administers mandatory health insurance, which provides universal coverage to the population (Table 1 ).
The hospital system in Croatia, with a network of 66 public institutions (3 clinical hospital centers, 4 clinical hospitals, 7 clinics, 23 general hospitals, 27 special hospitals, and 2 health resorts) accounts for over 50% of total public health care costs. Like most countries in former Yugoslavia, Croatia inherited a fee-for-service (FFS) hospital payment system, where hospitals were reimbursed on the basis of inputs used for each procedure. The payment system consisted of three separate components: (1) hospital hotel services, paid via a flat rate per diem; (2) medical services provided; and (3) pharmaceuticals and other supplies that were paid for separately, depending on the cost of each item. Under the FFS schedule, hospitals had incentives to maintain high bed occupancy rates and extend length of stay. High occupancy rates resulted in stable hospital funding through per diem payments, while the majority of costs tended to be concentrated in the first few days of hospital stays. Low occupancy rates also increased the risk that the HZZO would lower the global budget ceiling for hospitals.
Several reforms were introduced beginning in 2002 to increase efficiency in the hospital system (see Figure 1 and the Appendix for more information). First, broad casebased groupings called payment according to the therapeutic procedure (PPTP) were introduced in Croatia in 2002. Initially introduced only for a select number of procedures, the PPTP system expanded over time with a large expansion in 2005. By then, the number of services reimbursed via the PPTP system had grown to 118 selected diagnoses with the remainder still being paid for through FFS. Although the PPTP system was intended to provide hospitals with incentives to increase technical efficiency in service provision, in reality, the broad-based groupings were quite unpopular with providers as interventions for the case groupings were often more costly. Providers believed that the intensity of resource use was underestimated for more complicated medical cases.
In 2009, PPTP groups were abandoned and formal diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) were introduced, known locally as dijagnostičko terapijske skupine (DTS). DRGs, which have much more refined case-groupings, are the most effective system of classification in health care and are used in most European countries, the United States, and Australia. DRG classifies cases of acute care into groups requiring similar consumption of hospital resources and that have similar clinical characteristics. Unlike PPTP, DTS has 671 groups of therapeutic-diagnostic procedures, which means that it is much more accurate in the pricing
process. An example of the groups for cataract procedures is shown in Figure 2 . Croatia's DTS system is based on the Australian Refined Diagnosis Related Groups (AR-DRG) version 5.1, but modified for the Croatian context. it was introduced in all Croatian hospitals, initially running in tandem with the existing billing system. During this period, HZZO actively worked with hospitals to ensure the appropriateness and quality of coding. One of the greatest challenges with the introduction of the Australian system in Croatia was the difference in DRG/DTS costing between the two countries. The original AR-DRG system used Australian data on resource use, clinical practice, and hospital billing. A second challenge was related to a form of -gaming‖ known as -code creep‖ in DRG systems, i.e. coding patients as having more serious or complicated conditions than they actually have. In Australia six different mechanisms are now employed to reduce this risk of upcoding 2 .
Using data over 10 years, this study examines the efficiency and quality impacts across three provider payment systems in Croatia: (1) the original fee-for-service (FFS); (2) broad case-based groupings under the PPTP system, and (3) DRG case-based groupings under DTS, which are in effect today. 3 The main objective is to examine the impact of introducing case-based payment systems, both broad (PPTP) and more detailed (DTS Shmueli et al. 2002 , Cutler 1990 , Kahn et al. 1990 ).
At the same time, since hospitals are able to earn revenue for each additional case, it is possible that the number of hospital admissions (and possible readmissions) may increase.
Empirical research suggests that volume of activity does not increase, although there are some mixed results (Serra and Wagstaff 2010, Dafny 2005 , Shmueli et al. 2002 , Kroneman and Nagy 2001 , Cutler 1990 .
From a quality perspective, theoretically there may be negative effects on patient health outcomes if hospitals use less costly and less effective tests or procedures. This potential negative effect should be balanced, however, by the incentive to fully treat a patient so that additional costs are not incurred under the same -case‖. Empirically, most evidence suggests that introduction of case-based payment systems have had no effect (and even positive in some cases) on health outcomes (Serra and Wagstaff 2010 , Cutler 1995 , Feinglass and Holloway, 1991 Kahn et al., 1990 ). were introduced across the whole system at the same time, with the same payment scheme for all hospitals.
This study uses a time series approach to examine the impact of case-based payment systems. Building on the work by Kahn et al. (1990) The 5 procedures selected are cataracts, pneumonia, coronary bypass, appendectomy, and hip replacement. These 5 procedures were selected because they were common procedures, a mix of different types of cases, and the procedure codes existed through all the different payment methods. Four are surgical, and pneumonia is a medical procedure. Table 2 shows how the procedural codes correspond across the different payment systems from 2000-2009. 5 Hospitalization claims data over 10 years (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) were collected from HZZO for 4 A few studies have used a differences-in-differences approach between treatment and comparison providers such as Yipp and Eggleston (2001) and Dafny (2005) . Serra and Wagstaff (2010) use a differences-indifferences approach to examine treatment and comparison countries. these 5 procedures from all 68 hospitals in Croatia. 6 The final dataset consists of 352,618 records (number of cases). Each record contained data concerning patient age, facility, treatment dates, length of stay, and amount billed to HZZO. The main outcomes of interest are: i) volume of activity, ii) average length of stay (ALOS).
The interrupted time series approach requires data to be in equally spaced intervals over time, so the data was aggregated to each month for each hospital. A fixed-effects, firstorder autoregressive model was estimated as specified in Equation (1) however, there appears to be strong reversion to mean (declining variance as measured by standard deviation) for length of stay. 7 The standard deviations (reported in parentheses in Table 2 ) decline over time-for example, the ALOS standard deviation for cataracts declined from about 4 to 2.4 days, for bypass from a little over 10 to less than 9 days, and for hip replacements from 11 to 6.7 days. In a well-functioning case-based payment system, this is what we would expect as less efficient hospitals catch-up to the more efficient hospitals. Figure 5 graphs the numbers of cases by each procedure type to make the trends more evident. 8 Cases for most procedures are increasing over time, which is what we would expect from an aging population, and one with increasing resources for health care. In particular, the number of cataracts and hip replacements are icnreasing over time, which is also partly due to
System-level Descriptive Statistics
Croatian health policy to reduce waiting lists and increase cases for both procedures. As we would expect, appendectomy cases remain constant, although there is an interesting decline in 2009.
Average length of stay (ALOS) by year is graphed in Figure 6 . Overall, ALOS is steadily declining over the 10 year period for all 5 procedures, although more so for hip replacement and cataracts. The ITS regressions confirm some of the descriptive statistic results (see Table 3 ).
Each 
Quality -Readmissions
Although attribution to the introduction of PPTP or DTS is difficult, efficiency has improved in hospitals as Table 3 shows declining ALOS over time for all five procedures.
Given that efficiency has improved, it is important to prevent any unintended consequences of decreasing quality. To examine any effects on hospital quality, we collected additional To get a sense of whether hospitals are -purposely‖ increasing readmissions in order to earn more revenue, we examine the length of stay of readmissions. Under a DRG system, a readmission (like an additional case) results in an additional payment, so hospitals may be incentivized to readmit high cost cases as opposed to extending a patient's stay under the original case code. Under this scenario, readmissions would increase under a DRG system even if quality remained high. As a robustness check, we examine the length of stay of the readmissions to get a sense of whether reported readmissions are -real‖ readmissions. Overall these results suggest that Croatia's introduction of case-based payment systems is having its intended effect of improving efficiency and reducing ALOS, while maintaining patient quality. What is somewhat worrisome, however, is the responsiveness of hospitals to changes in coding, most evident in pneumonia cases. As the implementation of DTS continues, it will be important to continue to actively monitor the volume of all procedures separately to ensure that hospitals are accurately reporting their cases. Only with available and transparent data can accountability increase and improvements be made. For example, it would be useful to undertake a similar study in future years to examine imapcts on efficiency, volume, and quality.
Particular attention needs to be given to pneumonia cases, for which there has been a Table 1 . The share of persons insured by the mandatory health insurance in the total population 1998. 2000. 2001. 2003. 2005. 2007. 2008. 2009 
Appendix. Background on the Croatian Health Care System
Croatia is a Central European country, which gained its independence and sovereignty in May 1991. Health care is provided through health care institutions, which have contracts with the HZZO. Heath care in Croatia is carried at three levels -primary, secondary and tertiary. Hospital health care at the secondary level includes diagnosis, treatment and medical rehabilitation, medical care and boarding in a hospital. The tertiary level provides care, but also conducts more complex activities in specific branches of medicine, medical education, and research. Hospital providers at the secondary level include general hospitals, special hospitals and health resorts (sanatoria). All general hospitals and the majority of special hospitals are public county-owned. While general hospitals primarily serve the population of their respective county, special hospitals serve the entire population of Croatia. General hospitals perform small procedures in surgery, internal medicine, pediatrics, gynecology and obstetrics, and emergency medicine. Special hospitals are for specialist, consultative, and inpatient treatment for certain illnesses or age groups. Health resorts provide health care, specialist, and hospital rehabilitation through natural health sources. In Croatia classification of hospitals and organization of the health system has been regulated by the Healthcare Act and Network of Public Health Services (Network). In 2009 there were 66 public institutions in hospital health system, of which there were 3 clinical hospital centers, 4 clinical hospitals, 7 clinics, 23 general hospitals, 27 special hospitals, and 2 health resorts. In these hospitals a total 21.945 beds have been contracted. Of the total number of beds, 15.978 are for acute care, 653 beds for prolonged, sub-acute treatment, 3.344 for chronic disease (chronic mental illnesses, chronic diseases in children, chronic lung diseases) and 1.970 for acute and chronic treatment.
Hospitals as participants in health system are the most significant "consumers" of health care resources, accounting for 50% of total health care costs. Hospital resources are regulated through hard budgets. If a hospital exceeds its annual budget it will not receive additional funding for any bills levied for further services provided. Conversely if hospitals do not provide enough services to account for all of their budgets in a given year, then, in accordance with their contracts with the HZZO, in the subsequent fiscal year their budgets should be reduced by an amount equal to these unspent funds.
